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Abstract 
Correctly implementing the provisions of direct tax law is of the most important objectives 
of Tax Affairs Organization; accordingly, tax penalty system is among the most crucial guarantees 
for enforcement of this law. On the other hand, since tax is of long standing in Iran, compared to the 
majority of developing countries and some developed ones, the performance of tax system is an 
indicative of weaknesses with respect to law efficiency. Reluctant acceptance, and inefficiency of 
the previous tax law as well as the penalty system belonging to it, has caused to be revised and 
reformed. Reformation of the pervious law and creation of the existing one were aimed at 
accomplishing the objectives of development program in tax sector. However, with regard to what 
should have been materialized according to the anticipations, the country's tax law suffers from 
significant drawbacks with some existing articles and paragraphs. The present paper investigates 
two domains of jobs and companies in Ardabil province, and reveals the ineffectiveness of penalty 
system in these two tax sources.  
Keywords: tax penalties, tax sources, tax culture 
 
Introduction 
In 2001, in order to adopt new tax policies, the considered penalties were improved with 
regard to some aspects in comparison with those of previous years. On one hand, many cases of 
taxpayers' violation were introduced and presented. On the other hand, most of violations included 
criminal penalties, in addition to financial penalties, and the controlling power of penalties 
increased. Furthermore, by offering more reasonable prices concerning more widespread cases of 
taxpayers’ carelessness, such as not submitting declaration and financial statements and legal 
registers, submitting false declaration, and presenting unreal registers, efficiency and effectiveness 
were taken into consideration more than ever (Magsoudi, 2005, 8). 
Considering the above-mentioned conditions, because exemptions are granted and tax 
penalties are imposed, in an inappropriate ways, and, full payment of tax penalties is overlooked, 
today we observe that, sometimes just for prompt payment of the tax, penalties are waived or 
exemptions are granted and penalties are eliminated on certain occasions, which, in addition to 
confusion, causes some taxpayers to hope for future economic decisions and financial liabilities. 
Therefore, it hinders the immediate payment of tax. For example, waiving the penalties on certain 
occasions, especially final months of the year, exerts negative effects on the taxpayers who have 
paid their taxes immediately (Mousavi, 2007, 33). 
 
Examining the effectiveness of tax penalties 
In Iran, a one-year interval in receiving the taxes occurs because of various factors such as 
legal permits (a four-month reprieve after the end of the year to submit declaration, and following 
the time passed for compiling and distributing regional value  and tax coefficients of the previous 
year and issuing an order for  starting to check and also a one-year reprieve for tax-related 
examination of the received statements and sometimes a five-year reprieve for checking the 
performance of the taxpayers who have not submitted declaration), vagueness concerning rules and 
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regulations (lawful exemptions and contradictory viewpoints about qualifying for the exemptions), 
extension of checking steps and finalizing the taxes, not exploring new economic activities, legal 
gaps, etc.  
Concerning direct tax law, to shorten the respite, Iran, as the majority of countries do, uses 
certain anticipated tools, like penalties enacted in March 1987 and amendments following it, which 
state how penalties are imposed on taxpayers who have not fulfilled their legal duties pertaining to 
declaration and payment of taxes. With the exception of the penalty for not submitting declaration 
by legal entities (companies) and people subjected to the paragraphs   1 and 2 of Article 95 of direct 
tax law, as well as, the penalties of the issue of Article 169 repeated of this law (the amendment of 
2001), all penalties with reference to Article 191 of the mentioned law can be exempted. According 
to Article 190 of direct tax law, a delay in paying tax would be subjected to a fine of 2.5 % per 
month from the expiration date of the deadline for submitting declaration or the maturity for paying 
the tax. On the other hand, with reference to Note 2 of the same law, charging a fine more than one 
year will not be possible. Consequently, even if the authority of the exemption of penalties of the 
issue of Article 191 of direct tax law is ignored, lengthening the predictable checking stages and 
ineffectiveness of the mentioned fine in shortening the respite are likely to happen. Levying fines 
has always been associated with violation, and charging it leads to a conflict between taxpayers and 
the county's tax system, which can make taxpayers, with the help of a variety of interpretation on 
rules and regulations, put in a request for the exemption of the penalties based on tax organization's 
authorities and not consider the fine of delay or not fulfilling legal duties as a materialized view for 
themselves.  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Tax penalties affect taxpayers in jobs domain. 
Hypothesis 2: Tax penalties affect taxpayer in company’s domain 
Sub-Hypotheses: 
Delay penalty affects taxpayers concerning jobs domain.  
The penalty for not submitting declaration affects taxpayers in jobs domain. 
The penalty for not giving registers and financial statements affects taxpayers in jobs 
domain. 
The penalty for rejecting the registers affects taxpayers in jobs domain.  
The penalty for not submitting salaries list affects taxpayers in jobs domain. 
The delay penalty affects taxpayers in company’s domain. 
The penalty for not submitting declaration affects taxpayers in company’s domain. 
The penalty for not giving registers and financial statements affects taxpayers in company’s 
domain. 
The penalty for rejecting the registers affects taxpayers in company’s domain. 
The penalty for not submitting salaries list affects taxpayers in company’s domain. 
The penalty for not submitting the contract affects taxpayers in company’s domain.  
 
Variables 
Independent Variable: Tax penalties are considered as an independent variable for explaining 
the factor effective in taxpayers in domains of jobs and companies. 
Dependent Variable: The ratio of penalties to total taxes of taxpayers subjected to a penalty 
is considered as a dependent variable for investigating the effectiveness of penalties. This ratio 
includes all of ratios of the mentioned penalties in direct tax law, as it has been elaborated in sub-
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hypotheses. To explore the effectiveness of the penalties, we examined taxpayers' penalties over two 
successive years using a paired-sample T-test at a 95% confidence interval.   
 
Sampling Method 
Statistical population comprises tax sources of jobs and legal entities of Adabil province 
which are studied in a two-year period (2006-2007). Regarding the high number of taxpayers, to 
select samples using ranked random sampling, with Alpha = 0.01 and t = 2/58; according to the table 
of sample size determination of Bartlette, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) with level of error = 0.03, the 
number of samples from each tax sources in Ardabil, Parsabad, and Bilesavar was determined. 
 
Results 
Since penalties for not submitting the contract, not deducing and depositing withholding 
taxes in samples in jobs domain as well as penalty for not deducing and depositing withholding 
taxes in samples in company’s domain were not observed, sub-hypotheses pertaining to those 
penalties were not confirmed. 
The results obtained from testing Hypothesis 1, predicting that tax penalties affect taxpayers 
in jobs domain, and its sub-hypotheses are displayed in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Results from testing H1 (jobs domain) 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable Limit t P-value Result 
Low High 
Penalties' 
effectiveness* 
Ratio of penalties to 
tax 
-0.030 0.105 1.087 
9 
0/279 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness1 
Ratio of delay 
penalty to all 
penalties  
-0.089 0.148 0.491 0/624 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness2 
Ratio of penalty for 
not submitting 
declaration to all 
penalties  
-0.064 0.132 0.685 0/494 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness3 
Ratio of penalty for 
not giving the 
register to all 
penalties 
-0.122 0.024 -1.325 0/187 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness4 
Ratio of penalty for 
rejecting the 
registers to all 
penalties 
-0.001 0.198 -1 0/319 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness5 
Ratio of penalty for 
not submitting the 
salaries list to all 
penalties 
-0.013 0.004 -1 0/319 Ineffective 
* Testing H1 
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Sub-hypotheses 
The results obtained from examining Hypothesis 2, predicting that tax penalties affect 
taxpayers in company’s domain, and its sub-hypotheses are displayed in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Results from testing H2 (companies domain) 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable Limit t P-value Result 
Low High 
Penalties' 
effectiveness* 
Ratio of penalties to 
tax 
-0.047 0.12 0.870 0/387 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness1 
Ratio of delay 
penalty to all 
penalties  
-0.002 0.095 0.491 0/624 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness2 
Ratio of penalty for 
not submitting 
declaration to all 
penalties  
-0.293 0.039 -1.52 0/131 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness3 
Ratio of penalty for 
not giving the 
register to all 
penalties 
-0.046 0.1 0.734 0/465 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness4 
Ratio of penalty for 
rejecting the 
registers to all 
penalties 
-0.027 0.062 0.771 0/443 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness5 
Ratio of penalty for 
not submitting the 
salaries list to all 
penalties 
-0.001 0.032 1.802 0/076 Ineffective 
Penalty's 
effectiveness6 
Ratio of penalty for 
not submitting the 
contract to all 
penalties 
-2.587 1.955 -0.329 0/751 Ineffective 
* Testing H2 
 
Conclusion 
The results achieved from evaluating the hypotheses indicate ineffectiveness of tax penalties 
system in Ardabil province, which reveals that in Ardabil, in an inappropriate way, exemptions are 
granted and tax penalties are imposed, additionally, full payment of tax penalties is overlooked. 
Today, sometimes only because of prompt payment of tax, penalties are waived or exemptions are 
granted and penalties are eliminated on certain occasions, which, in addition to confusion, cause 
prompt taxpayers to become disappointed. Moreover, because of a double-digit inflation in the 
country's economy, tax penalties system with small percentages cannot act as a prohibitory factor 
effective in taxpayers' behavior. It is to be noted that lack of the right tax culture in the country and 
other cultural, political, and even religious conditions, has contributed to the ineffectiveness of tax 
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system, which demands the cooperation of administrators of these domains more than ever for 
improving the tax system. 
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